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COMMENTS
REMEDIAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ORDERS: COMPELLING EMPLOYER
RECOGNITION WHERE THE
UNION HAS NEVER
ATTAINED A MAJORITY
INTRODUCTION

American workers have a fundamental protected right to
representation by the labor union of their choice. The National
Labor Relations Act' (the Act) provides guidelines for the determination of a labor work unit's 2 choice of representative; these
guidelines are binding on the employer when negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. 3 The legislative history of the
Act 4 makes clear that Congress mandated collective bargaining

to promote industrial peace and insure a collective voice for the
laborer.5
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
2. Only those employees having a substantial mutuality of interest in
wages, hours, and working conditions should be grouped in a single unit. 14
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ANNuAL REPORT 32-33 (1949).

3. Section 8(d) defines collective bargaining as a mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to confer in good
faith "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 20 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). To bar other unions seeking to represent the work unit, an agreement must be in writing and contain substantial
terms and conditions of employment sufficient to stabilize the bargaining
agreement. See Appalachian Shale Prod. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958). A
contract for a fixed term will bar a petition by a rival union for only three
years even if the term of the agreement is longer. General Cable Corp., 139
N.L.R.B. 1123i(1962).
4. The Act was synthesized in three stages: the Wagner Act of 1935,
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. R.A.
GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-

GAINING 1 (1976).
5. Hearings on S. 2926: Hearings Before Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT at 27 (1935). In his opening
statement Senator Wagner stressed that:
It]hose who have been interested in avoiding industrial strife and
bringing about industrial peace and industrial democracy have advocated some board of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration when both
parties submit. The only way that the worker will be accorded the freedom of contract to which, under our theory of government, he is entitled, is by the intrusion of the government to give him that right, by
protecting collective bargaining.
Id. at 47.
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Before collective bargaining can begin, the representative of
the work unit must be selected. Under section 9 of the Act, 6 the
National Labor Relations Board (Board) may conduct representation elections to determine the employees' choice of representative, upon a showing of substantial support by the petitioning
union. Such a showing is generally made by union authorization cards signed by the employees and checked against the employer's payroll records by a Board representative. The Board,
however, generally will not proceed to an election on a petition
filed by the union unless the petition demonstrates support by
of the employees in the work unit to be
at least 30 percent
7
represented.
In exceptional circumstances, the employer's duty to bargain 8 may arise absent a Board-certified election. Under the
original Wagner Act, 9 the Board could certify unions by secret
ballot elections or by "any other suitable method."'1 Authorization card checks were often used as an alternative to the holding
of an election." In Cudahy Packing Co.,12 however, the Board
departed from its former policy of certification without an election and concluded that the policies of the Act would best be
effectuated by elections. As a result, in 1947 the Act was
amended to exclude the phrase "any other suitable method"
and the election process became the only codified method for
certification. Nevertheless, the card check has continued to hold
its prominence in unfair labor practice proceedings where it is
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
7. Employer petitions are not subject to this requirement. 29 U.S.C.

§ 159(c)(1) (1976). If the petition is flied by an employer, neither the employer nor the union is required to show that a given number of employees

have designated the union. See also B. MELTZER,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 290 (2d ed. 1977).

LABOR LAW CASES,

8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
10. Section 9(c) of the Wagner Act stated:
Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the repre-

sentation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy
and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing, upon due
notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under Section 10 [29
U.S.C. § 160] or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or
utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representative.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 246 (C.J. Morris ed. 1971) (emphasis added).

11. Until 1939, the Board relied extensively on authorization cards to
make union certifications. For a discussion of this early history, see MILLER

&BROwN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFr-HARTLEY, 133-34
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 359 (C.J. Morris ed. 1971).
12. 13 N.L.R.B. 526 (1939).

(1950). See also
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found that a fair election is unlikely. 13 It is a well established
policy of the Board to rely on a card-supported union majority in
issuing an order to bargain without an election. Thus, an employer may be required to engage in collective bargaining with a
"representative" who does not have the elective support of a ma14
jority of employees.
The refusal of an employer to bargain with a union demonstrating majority support may give rise to an unfair labor practice charge. This comment will analyze an employer's lawful
alternatives to bargaining absent or pending a Board-conducted
election. Specifically, the comment will criticize the loopholes
which permit an employer to commit unfair labor practices
without effective employee remedy, and will analyze the viability of the Board's recent issuance of a bargaining order where
the union had not attained a card majority. 15 Finally, a discussion of the majoritarian principle of the National Labor Relations Act will demonstrate the obstacles the NLRB will face
should it, in the future, attempt to issue a bargaining order in
the absence of a showing of majority support for the union.
THE

DUTY TO BARGAIN UPON SHOWING OF MAJORrrY SUPPORT

After the Taft-Hartley amendment in 1947, which made elections the only codified method for certification, the use of authorization-card checks to determine majority support declined
sharply. 16 Employers, however, were allowed to recognize and
bargain with a union claiming to possess authorization cards
from a majority of employees. 17 Acceptance of the union's claim
13. Section 8(a) of the Act states that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer, inter alia, to interfere with an employee's section 7 rights, to interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, to
discriminate on the basis of union involvement, or to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
See also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (union authorization cards are reliable enough generally to provide a valid alternate route to
majority status).
14. United Dairy Farmers Coop., 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1577 (1981).
15. Id.
16. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 247 (C.J. Morris ed. 1971).
17. This decision was not without risk. In International Ladies Garment
Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961), an employer violated § 8(a) (2)
and § 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act by recognizing a union claiming majority support when the union did not have that support. Further, the employer's
good faith belief that the union represented a majority in the unit was not a
defense, especially where no attempt was made to verify the claim by
checking cards against payroll records. International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292, aI'd, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). The Board
found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the union's execution of the
collective bargaining agreement was a direct deprivation of the nonconsenting employees' organizational and bargaining § 7 rights and ordered the em-
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was not mandatory, and an employer who in good faith doubted
the union's majority status could refuse to bargain pending a
Board-conducted election. 18 The employer's refusal to bargain
had to be based in fact upon this good faith belief, and not on a
desire to buy time in which to undermine the union's majority
status prior to an election. 19
If an employer refused to bargain, and the union claiming
majority support lost the subsequent election due to employer
unfair labor practices, the NLRB could rely on the card authorization despite the lack of statutory mandate. The initial inquiry
should ask whether there was a majority in fact when the em21
ployer refused to bargain, 20 and whether the cards were valid.
The latter requirement is easily satisfied, since the only fact
which will invalidate a card is a statement to the signer that the
card will only be used to obtain an NLRB election. 22 If the
ployer to withhold all recognition from the union. 366 U.S. at 737. But see
NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966) (NLRB finding of
unlawful assistance by employer was unsupported by evidence, court of appeals denied enforcement without remanding as the alleged unfair labor
practice was three years old and the offending contract had expired).
18. NLRB v. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949). This good-faith
doubt requirement is known as the Joy Silk Doctrine.
19. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The
General Counsel must prove want of a good-faith doubt as to the union's
majority. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
Whether an employer is acting in good faith or bad faith in questioning
the union's majority is a determination which . . . must be made in

light of all the relevant facts of the case, including any unlawful conduct
of the employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between
the refusal and the unlawful conduct.
Id. at 1079. See also Converters Graveire Serv., Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 379 (1967).
For a critical analysis of the "good faith" requirement and an alternate proposal, see Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. REV. 349 (1969).
20. Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining
Union Majority, 16 LAB. L.J. 434 (1965). The date of the employer's refusal
to bargain has been held to be either the date the employer receives the
union's letter seeking recognition, see, e.g., Allegheny Pepsi Cola Bottling
Co. v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1962), enforcing 134 N.L.R.B. 388 (1961), or
the date of the employer's letter denying recognition, see, e.g., Burton-Dixie
Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 880 (1953), enforced, 210 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1954).
21. For explanation and criticism of the Board's approach to the validity
of authorization cards, see Rains, Authorization Cards as an Indefensible
Basisfor Board-DirectedUnion RepresentationStatus: Fact and Fancy, 18
LAB. L.J. 226 (1967); Comment, Refusal-To-Recognize Charges Under Section
9(a)(5) of the NLRB: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. CHI. L.
REv. 389 (1966); Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
22. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F.2d
917 (6th Cir. 1965). Under the CumberlandShoe doctrine, if the card itself is
unambiguous, i.e., states on its face that the signer authorizes the union to
represent him for collective bargaining purposes and not to seek an election, it will be counted unless it is shown that the employee was told that
the card was to be used solely to secure an election. If the card states "for
election only" it may still be counted if it is found that statements by the
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Board finds that the employer engaged in unfair labor practices,
i.e., refused in bad faith to bargain and subsequently undermined the union's majority support prior to the election, it
would rely on the only proof of actual employee choice: the authorization cards. The Board would issue a bargaining order despite the union's failure to win majority support in the
23
election.
Because of the difficulty of proving the employer's state of
mind, the Board altered its position in 1971. Regardless of his
reasons, an employer could refuse to bargain when confronted
with a card majority, provided he committed no unfair labor
practices prior to an election. 24 If the union ultimately lost the
election, it was precluded from using unfair labor practice proceedings to obtain a Board-issued bargaining order. Thus, an
employer could legally avoid bargaining with a union which had
status needed to impose a duty to
in fact attained the majority
25
bargain under the Act.
The Board's new position was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Company v. NLRB. 26 Employers faced with demands for recognition refused to bargain absent an election. The unions filed
unfair labor practice charges, claiming the refusals were unfair
labor practices under section 8(a) (5).27 The Board held that the
employers did not violate section 8(a) (5) solely by refusing to
accept anything short of an election as evidence of majority staunion organizer completely negate what the card says on its face. The trial
examiner in Cumberland Shoe found that seventeen employees were told
by fellow employees that the purpose of the cards was to secure an election.
The Board counted the cards anyway, since the employees were not told
that to secure an election was the only purpose of the cards. Id. at 1278.

Employees may have believed that the only purpose was to obtain an election, but the Board will count such cards if the employees were not solicited
on that basis. Bannon Mills, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 611 (1964).
23. Bryant Chucking Grinder Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1526 (1966) (employer or-

dered to bargain based on card majority after dissipating the majority
through unfair labor practices).
24. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971).
25. An employer confronted with a demand for recognition is under no
duty to fie a petition for an election. 29 U.S.C. § 9(c)(1)(B) (1976). He can

merely sit back, allow the union to do so, 29 U.S.C. § 9(c) (1) (A) (1976), and

hope that the time prior to the election will provide a "cooling off" period for
his employees and dissipate the union's majority status. Even if the union
ultimately prevails, the employer is in no worse position than if he had vol-

untarily recognized the union at the time of the union's demand. In fact, he
has bought time to prepare, both financially and strategically, for collective
bargaining negotiations.
26. 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
27. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1976).
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tus. 28 The Supreme Court agreed, pointing out that a union

faced with a refusal to bargain has the burden of taking the next
step and invoking the Board's election procedure. While recognizing that the union has the alternative of pressing unfair labor
charges, the Court stated that because the ultimate goal is industrial peace, a policy of encouraging secret elections is most
favored under the Act. 29 The Court further agreed with the
Board that an employer, after refusing to bargain, is not 30
required by section 8(a) (5) to file an election petition himself.
The problem with the rules and procedures outlined above
is that they failed to close a loophole available to employers determined to prevent union organization. Though a collective
bargaining order could issue if an employer dissipated a majority through unfair labor practices, no corrective action was available when an employer, through coercive behavior, prevented
the union from attaining a card majority or even the requisite
amount of support to warrant an election. 3 1 In 1969, however,
the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
28. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 721 (1971).
The Board noted that the record did not contain evidence of independent
unfair labor practices which would justify issuing a bargaining order. Id.
29. The Court acknowledged, however, that this alternative "promises
to consume much time." In the cases involved in this ruling, the time
between filing the charge and the Board's ruling was about 4 1/ years and 6
1%2
years respectively. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S.
301, 306 (1974).
30. In contrast, the Court expressly stated that the union has the burden, when faced with a rejection of authorization cards, of petitioning for a
Board-conducted election. Id. at 310. But see Snow &Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709,
enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962) (employer violates § 8(a) (5) by rejecting card majority after express agreement to abide by showing of majority status by means other than elections). See also GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 106 (1976) (refusal
after agreement to accept authorization cards constitutes violation of
§ 8(a) (5)).
At one time, the Board refused to entertain post-election refusal-to-bargain charges by a defeated union on the theory that the union had to choose
between proving its majority by filing an election petition or by filing refusal-to-bargain charges. Aiello Dairy Farms, Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954).
In 1964, however, the Board decided that henceforth it would entertain refusal-to-bargain charges fied after the union lost the subsequent election
based on the employer's failure to recognize the union prior to the election.
Bernel Foam Products Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). If the union loses, it
may still file a charge based on the employer's pre-election conduct, but it
will not get a bargaining order unless there are objections to the election in
the representation case and the employer misconduct warrants setting
aside the election. Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964), enforced,
360 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965).
31. The Board generally will conduct an election upon a showing of support from 30% of the work unit. 29 U.S.C. § 9(c) (1) (A) (1976). In reality,
however, a union will normally not seek an election unless it has obtained
authorization cards from at least 50% of the unit it seeks to represent.
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Co.32 redefined an employer's duty to bargain. In addition, Gissel established through dictum a new category of employer unfair labor practice which would warrant a collective bargaining
order absent any showing of majority status. This dictum eventually emerged as Board law.
GiSSEL AND ITS APPLICATION

In 1969, the Supreme Court consolidated four cases for decision: 33 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company, Inc.,34 NLRB v.
Heck's, Inc.,3 General Steel Products,Inc. v. NLRB, 36 and NLRB
v. Sinclair Company.37 In Gissel and Heck's, the Board found
unfair labor practices, including violations of section 8(a) (5),
and ordered recognition without an election. 38 In GeneralSteel,
an election was held; the union lost. The Board, however, set
aside the election and issued a bargaining order because the
39
employer had committed pre-election unfair labor practices.
In each case, the union had valid authorization cards from a majority of the employees and the employer's refusal to bargain
was motivated not by a "good faith doubt of the union's majority
status, but by a desire to gain time to dissipate the status."4 In
all three cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 41 rejected the Board's finding of a section 8(a) (5) violation and refused to enforce the Board's collective bargaining orders. The
court held that authorization cards were so inherently unreliable that their use afforded an employer a presumption of good
faith when refusing to bargain. In effect, the Board's only avail32. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
33. Because of the factual similarities, the Court disposed of the four
cases together. Id. at 579 (1969).
34. 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968).
35. 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968).
36. 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968).
37. 397 F.2d 157 (lst Cir. 1968).
38. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 583. The Board found that all three employers had engaged in

restraint and coercion of employees in violation of § 8(a) (1). In Gissel, the
employer had interrogated employees about union activities, threatened
them with discharge and promised them benefits. In Heck's, the employer
had interrogated employees, threatened reprisals, created the appearance
of surveillance, and offered benefits for opposing the union. In General
Steel, the employer had interrogated the employees and threatened them
with discharge. In addition, the employers in Gissel and Heck's had wrongfully discharged employees for engaging in union activities, in violation of
§ 8(a) (3). Because the employers had rejected the card-based majority in
bad faith, the Board found all three in violation of § 8(a) (5). Id. at 584.
41. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Heck's, 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); General Steel Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 398
F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968).
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able remedy was to conduct a secret ballot election. 42
The facts in the fourth case, Sinclair, were essentially the
43
same: the union's card majority was rejected by the employer.
The First Circuit, however, upheld the Board's finding of unfair
labor practices in actions other than the refusal to bargain" and
the employer to recognize
affirmed the Board order requiring
45
and bargain with the union.
The Supreme Court, in considering these four cases, decided that: (1) there may be a duty to bargain absent a Board
election;4 6 (2) generally, union authorization cards are reliable
enough to be used as an alternative to an election; 47 and (3) the
Board may issue a bargaining order when an employer rejects a
unfair labor practices which make a
card majority and commits
48
fair election unlikely.
Most importantly, the Court differentiated among degrees of
employer misconduct in determining whether a bargaining order was justified. The opinion defines three categories which
have been relied on in subsequent decisions. The first category
represents those cases marked by "outrageous and pervasive"
employer unfair labor practices. In such cases a bargaining order may be imposed "without need of inquiry into majority status on the basis of cards or otherwise. '49 The second category
includes those cases where the unfair labor practices are "less
pervasive" but would nonetheless impede the election process.50
The cases before the Court in Gissel were of this type. The third
category represents those minor unfair labor practices which do
42. The Fourth Circuit did, however, sustain the Board's finding of
§ 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) violations.

43. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 587 (1968).
44. The trial examiner found, inter alia, that the employer violated
§ 8(a)(1) by threatening the employees' job security, orally and through
pamphlets, after refusing to bargain in bad faith. The Board agreed that
these communications, when considered as a whole, reasonably caused employees to believe that if the union won the election the company would
close its plant or transfer the weaving production, with resultant loss of jobs
to the wire weavers. The Board further agreed that the employer's activi-

ties "also interfered with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in
the election" and "tended to foreclose the possibility of holding a fair election." Id. at 589.
45. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (lst Cir. 1968).

46. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969). The Court specifically approved the use of a bargaining order where the employer's practices have a tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the
election process.
47. Id. at 601-10. The Court held that, despite the superiority of the election process, cards may surpass that reliability when employer unfair labor
practices make the holding of a fair election impossible. Id. at 603.
48. Id. at 614.
49. Id. at 613.
50. Id. at 614.
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not render a fair election impossible, but may warrant setting
the election aside without the issuance of a bargaining order.5'
Thus, it is immaterial whether the Board places the employer's unfair labor practice within the first or second category.
If the violation is either outrageous and pervasive or sufficiently
coercive, the Board may exercise the same remedial action: the
issuance of a bargaining order. The major difference is the degree of inquiry into the status of union employee support. The
Court in Gissel stated that the Board, in category I cases, has
the power to issue a bargaining order without any inquiry into
whether the union had ever attained a majority status. 52 Because the cases in Gissel were not of this type, this suggestion
was pure dictum, and for the twelve years subsequent to Gissel,
the courts treated it as such. While the Board referred to its
power to issue a bargaining order to remedy outrageous unfair
labor practices absent a majority, it repeatedly refused to exer53
cise the power.
51. Id. at 615. In such cases, the Board will conduct a second or "re-run"
election when conditions have stabilized. For a critical discussion of re-run
elections and the abuse of the right of the union and employer to file objections to an election, see Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L.
REV. 209 (1963). Pollitt's analysis is discussed in Getman & Goldberg, The
Myth of Labor Law Expertise, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 681, 691-94 (1972).
52. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1968).
53. Even before Gissel, the Board alluded to the possibility of having
the power. H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714 (1965). In Elson, the
union received 11 signed authorization cards from a 23-man unit. The employer immediately embarked upon an intense anti-union campaign. The
Board recognized its duty under § 10(c) to fit the remedy to the violation
and to re-create the conditions and relationships that would have been had
there been no unfair labor practices. Id. at 715. The Board was unconvinced that § 9(a) would permit a bargaining order where majority status
had not been attained, and instead created a remedy which purported to recreate the atmosphere which existed prior to the unfair labor practices.
The employer was ordered to mail copies of the notice to individual employees, give the union access to bulletin boards, provide to the union the facilities for a one hour meeting, and eventually host a re-run election. Id. at 71718. This type of remedial authority attempts to reestablish the status quo
ante. Seeler v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1975); GPD, Inc.
v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 963, 964 (6th Cir. 1970). Elson acknowledges the anomaly
of punishing an employer for destroying a union majority while virtually
ignoring unfair labor acts which prevent formation of a majority. H.E. Elson
Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714, 715 (1965).
After Gissel, in The Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557 (1970), the Board refused to issue a bargaining order although the unfair labor practices were
found to be of a "pervasive" nature. The union had not attained majority
status, and the Board, while alluding to its authority to issue a bargaining
order, held that the particular facts of the case did not warrant such a remedy. The Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557, 562 (1970). Instead, the Board issued a remedy similar to that in Elson, concluding:
[S] ince we are convinced in the circumstances of this case that the Respondent may have made it impossible for the union to obtain designations from 30% of the employees to support a petition for an election
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Finally, in August of 1981, the Board took the step mandated
by Gissel and issued a bargaining order in United Dairy Farmers
Cooperative Association, 4 a case in which the union had never
attained majority status. An examination of the history of this
case is necessary to its discussion. Immediately after organizing
activity was initiated among the employees, the employer embarked upon a series of unfair labor practices, including discharges, threats and unprecedented benefits. 55 Although the
union never attained majority status, the administrative law
judge, citing Gissel, recommended the issuance of a bargaining
order,5 6 reasoning that anything less assured the employer of
continued enjoyment of the "fruits of its repeated unfair labor
57
practices."
...[w]e shall, upon request of the Union .. .conduct an election in
the unit found appropriate.
Id. at 559. See also Bandag, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 72 (1976), where Chairman
Murphy, in his concurring opinion, stated: "As the Supreme Court noted in
Gissel, there may be some situations in which the employer's unfair labor
practices are so severe that a bargaining order may be appropriate notwithstanding the absence of a showing of majority status. This is not such a
case." Id. at 73 n.7.
54. 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1577 (1981).
55. Respondent employer's president made a series of plant closure
threats and its Board of Directors discharged a union-activist driver because of a trucking accident, although such action was unprecedented in
accident occurrence at the company. In addition, several weeks prior to the
election, the employer distributed an unprecedented cash bonus and, subsequent to the election, supervisors interrogated employees as to how they
had voted. Id. at 1578.
For examples of when benefits may constitute a violation of § 8(a) (1),
see NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964) (section 8(a) (1) prohibits not only threats or promises, but also conduct immediately favorable
to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging
upon their freedom of choice); Sugardale Foods, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 206 (1976)
(emphasizing the differences in amounts of raises among employees). But
cf.Russel Stover Candies, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 441 (1975) ("an employer, when
confronted by a union organizing campaign, must proceed as it would have
done had the union not been conducting its campaign"). See also, IngersollRand Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 77 (1975) (addressing the issue of how long an employer must refrain from granting benefits should the union begin an organizing campaign but not file a petition for an election).
For guidelines of the Board's attitude toward employee polls by employers, see Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964) (no unfair labor practice absent showing of pattern of employer hostility and discrimination);
Strucknes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967) (poll lawful because: (a) its
sole purpose was to ascertain whether the union represented a current majority; (b) employees given assurances against reprisals; (c) evidence
failed to establish employees answered untruthfully out of fear of reprisal;
and (d) polling occurred in a background free from hostility toward the
union); Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954) (although employees gave false answers, there was no evidence employer threatened them
with reprisal).
56. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n., 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1056 (1979).

57. Id.
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The Board declined to issue a bargaining order because the
union had never attained majority support. 58 Although the employer had engaged in "outrageous and pervasive" unfair labor
practices, the Board merely ordered remedies akin to those in
the earlier case of Elson Bottling Co.5 9 Two Board members indicated that the Board might have the authority to issue a bargaining order, despite nonmajority union support, but declined
to do so because of the risk of imposing a union on nonconsenting employees. A third member concurred with the result, but
dissented from the proposal that the Board had statutory authority to issue a bargaining order absent majority support. The
two dissenting members, however, urged issuance of a bargaining order under the authority confirmed by Gissel. Addressing
the issue of the risk of imposing a union on nonconsenting employees, the dissenters suggested that such a risk exists whenever a bargaining order issues after a union has lost an
60
election.
On appeal, the court of appeals enforced the Board's order,61 but further held that the Board possessed the authority,
as stated in Gissel, to issue a nonmajority bargaining order in
cases marked by "outrageous and pervasive" unfair labor practices which would render a fair election impossible. 62 The court
remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the facts
warranted such an order. By the time of the remand, the composition of the Board had changed, 63 and the majority held that the
facts warranted the issuance of a bargaining order.64 Therefore,
seven and one-half years after the unfair labor practices oc58. Id. at 1028.
59. H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714 (1965). See supra note 53.
The Board's order required, inter alia, that the employer "mail the notice to

employees and include it in company publications, publish the notice in
newspapers, have its president ... sign all notices and read the notice to
employees assembled for that purpose, and afford the Board a reasonable
opportunity to have an agent in attendance at such reading." The employer
was also required to grant the union the right to deliver a pre-election

speech during worktime and equal time and facilities to respond to any address by the employer to its employees concerning union representation.
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1577 n.4 (1981).
60. The Board was similarly divided in Haddon House Food Prods., Inc.,
242 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1979), decided on the same day as United Dairy.
61. United Dairy v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980). Both the union

and the employer filed petitions for review, and the Board cross-appealed
for enforcement of its order.
62. Id. at 1069.
63. The two members who authored the original majority opinion and
the concurring members were no longer on the Board, which left the two
original dissenters and one new member. Hence, the Board's decision on
remand was not surprising.
64. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1577 (1981).
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curred and twelve years after Gissel, the Board issued its first
nonmajority bargaining order.
What set United Dairy apart from less extraordinary cases
in which the Board may issue bargaining orders only if a union

has obtained a majority showing was the "gravity, extent, timing, and constant repetition" of the violations, which occurred
against a background of prior serious misconduct. 65 Finally, in
response to the issue of imposing a nonmajority union on the
employees, the Board noted that the union lost the election by a
margin of only 12-14.66 Finding that the employer committed its
first unfair labor practice on November 21, 1973,67the bargaining
obligation was deemed effective as of that date.
While United Dairy represents the Board's first exercise of
authority under Gissel category I, it is not the first instance of
the Board imposing a nonmajority union upon a work unit. In
Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v.
NLRB (Garwin Corp.) ,68 the Board found that the employer, in
order to avoid the union and an effective collective bargaining
agreement, closed its plant in New York and resumed substantially the same operations in Florida. 69 The Board, relying on
precedent in "partial closing" cases, 70 issued a bargaining order
65. Id. at 1580. The Board, citing Entwistle Mfg Co., 120 F.2d 432 (4th
Cir. 1941), emphasized that the discharge of an employee because of union
activity is a serious unfair labor practice which "goes to the very heart of
the Act." The effect of such discharges is the unmistakable message to the
remaining employees that union support equals loss of livelihood. The
Board found equally serious the employer's attempt to convert its employees to independent contractors, which would place them outside the scope
of the Act. See National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292
(1948).
66. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1577, 1580
(1981).
67. Id. A Board-issued bargaining order is effective as of either the date
the union is found to have first attained majority support, or the date the
employer first begins its unfair labor practices, whichever is later.
Smithtown Nursing Home, 228 N.L.R.B. 23 (1977). The effect is that any unilateral changes made by the employer subsequent to that date are in violation of § 8(a) (5): changes made in the face of, and independent of, a
collective bargaining agreement. See also Lyon's Restaurant, 234 N.L.R.B.
178 (1978).
68. 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967) [herein-

after referred to as Garwin].
69. A practice such as this is known as a "runaway shop." See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962).
70. Partial closing of a business to thwart unionization has been held to

be an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3). In Textile Workers Union v.

Darlington Mfg Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the Supreme Court held "that a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3) if motivated by a purpose to chili unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer
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to the employer at his Florida location. The order was reversed
on appeal because it denied the Florida employees their right to
choose their own bargaining representative. The Board argued
that the employer could not be allowed to take advantage of a
argument, viewing the order
loophole, but the court rejected this
71
as punitive rather than remedial.
While the Board has rather broad discretion in adapting
remedies to fit the effect of unfair labor practices, 72 its power to
order affirmative action under section 10(c) of the Act is remedial rather than punitive. 73 A bargaining order in nonmajority
cases, while seeking to remedy employer behavior, may be punithe
tive as to the majority of employees who have not chosen
74
union, and may in effect violate their section 7 rights.
It is questionable, furthermore, whether United Dairy will
act as effective precedent, because the Board so limited its holding to the particular facts of the case. 75 Finally, the United
Dairy bargaining order falls short of being a true Gissel category I order, such orders being authorized "without need of inquiry into majority status. ' '7 6 In contrast, the Board in United
Dairy sought to justify its order by stressing the minimal marand if the employer may reasonably have forseen that such closing would
likely have that effect." Id. at 274.
71. Compare Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263

(closing which deters the remaining employees is a violation of §§ 8(a) (1)

and 8(a) (3)) with Garwin, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
942 (1967). Garwin is difficult to reconcile, as the court made no inquiry
into a possible deterring effect on the Florida employees.
72. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
73. Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
74. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,

or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3).

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
75. The Board repeatedly stressed the 12-14 margin by which the union

lost the election and avoided the Garwin "risk of imposing a minority
union" argument with these election results. United Dairy Farmers Coop.
Ass'n, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1577, 1580 (1981). The Board further limited its

holding by stating:
[W]hat sets this particular case apart from "less extraordinary cases,"
in which we may issue bargaining orders only if a union has obtained a
majority showing, is the gravity, extent, timing, and constant repetition

of the violations, which occurred against a background of prior miscon[lit is rare indeed to encounter misconduct more grave than
duct ....
that which has occurred here.
Id. (emphasis added).
76. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969) (emphasis
added).
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gin by which the union ultimately lost the election. 77 Future
cases relying on United Dairy will most surely litigate the issue
of majority representation. 78 This does not seem entirely unreasonable because to take the Gissel Court's statement "without
need of inquiry into majority status" too literally would run the
risk of denigrating the majoritarian principle embodied in sec79
tion 9 of the Act.

THE MAJORITY PRINCIPLE UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT

Section 9(a) of the Act mandates that the exclusive representative of a work unit shall be the representative selected by a
majority of the employees in the unit.80 This majoritarian principle was also embodied in the Wagner Act, and virtually
81
adopted in whole by the 1947 Act as amended.
The Act, as well as the history of organized labor, attached
great significance to the choice of the majority of the employees.
The union elected by a majority acts as the "exclusive representative" 82 of all employees 83 and the employer must bargain with
84
that union regarding all terms and conditions of employment.
77. See supra note 58.

78. Ira Golub has suggested that a more convincing test in category I

bargaining orders is the "but for" test: the union can be said to have at-

tained majority status "but for" the employer's unfair labor practices.

Golub, The Propriety of Issuing Gissel BargainingOrders Where the Union
Has Never Attained a Majority, 29 LAB.L.J. 631, 639 (1978).

79. Id. at 637. See also The Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557 (1970) (Board

refused to issue a bargaining order as the record did not contain statistics

as to how many employees had actually supported the union). But see Bok,
The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
NLRA, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 133 (1964).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
81. See H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 11947] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 1135. While the Board will certify a union which receives
a majority of the votes cast, see Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515
(1937); NLRB v. Deutsch Co., 265 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 963; RCA Mfg. Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 168, 171 (1936), the National Mediation Board (administrative body of the National Railway Laborers Act) will
not certify a union unless a majority of the employees in the work unit participate in the election. Pan Amer. Airways, Inc., NMB No. R-1818 (1947).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
83. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board,63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 396 (1950). Huade Engineering Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 87 (1934), established the exclusive representative
concept, embodied in § 9(a) of the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), and
adopted by the present Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
84. Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all of the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect
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Furthermore, under the Celanese doctrine, 85 a union certified by
the Board enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status
for one year after certification. Following the certification year,
the presumption becomes rebuttable. In a refusal-to-bargain
case, 86 the burden of rebutting the presumption rests on the
party claiming a lack of majority. 87 The employer must establish either that at the time of refusal the union no longer enjoyed majority status or that his refusal was based on a good
faith doubt of the union's continued majority status. 88 While the
Board has consistently adhered to this formula for rebutting the
presumption,8 9 some circuits have been reluctant to agree, holding that an employer violates section 8(a) (5) of the Act, despite
a good faith doubt, if the General Counsel establishes that the
union, in fact, enjoyed majority status at the time of refusal to
bargain. 90
Additionally, the Board has held that lack of union membership or lack of participation in union activities does not, by itself,
indicate lack of union support, inasmuch as the union represents nonmembers as well as members. 9 1 The Board has simito rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment.

29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
85. Celanese Corp. of Amer., 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), recognized in
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 101 n.9 (1954). See also Automated Business
Sys., 205 N.L.R.B. 532 (1973).
86. Under § 8(a)(5) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
87. IAM Lodges 1746 & 743 v.NLRB,416 F.2d 809 (D.C.Cir. 1969) (absent
special circumstances, irrebuttable presumption continues for one year after certification and thereafter presumption continues until showing of sufficient evidence to cast serious doubt on union's majority status; burden is
then on General Counsel to prove that union in fact represents a majority);
Strange and Lindsay Beverages, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 1200 (1974) (employer
must show by objective facts that it had reasonable doubt as to union's majority status on date employer withdrew recognition).
88. Terrel Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969) (doubt must be based on
objective considerations and must not have been advanced for the purpose
of gaining time in which to undermine union).
89. Orion Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 633, enforced, 515 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1975)
(basis upon which employer formed his doubt was subjective, rather than
objective and employer found in violation of § 8(a) (5)); Automated Business Sys., 205 N.L.R.B. 532 (1973) (bargaining order issued when employer
committed unfair labor practices after withholding recognition based on
less than objective doubt); Ingress Plastene, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 481 (1969),
enforced in part, remanded in part, 430 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1970) (unlawful
withholding of recognition coupled with unfair labor practices prompted issuance of cease and desist order). See also Bally Case & Cooler, Inc., 172
N.L.R.B. 1127 (1968); Lloyd McKee Motors, 170 N.L.R.B. 1278 (1968).

90. IAM Lodges, 1746 &743 v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The
General Counsel is the prosecuting body of the NLRA.
91. NLRB v. Washington Manor, Inc., 519 F.2d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1975)
("high turnover of employees unaccompanied by objective evidence that
new employees do not support the union is no evidence of loss of majority
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larly held that nonmembership in the union or poor attendance
at meetings is not inconsistent with continued support for the
union, because individuals may subscribe to an organization's
by it, without being acpurpose, or may wish to be represented
92
tivists, paying dues, or joining.
It is also well established that unless the majority of its employees desires union representation, the employer may not
lawfully impose such representation on them. 93 Thus, the Board
has consistently presumed that a voluntarily-recognized union
represents the majority of the unit employees. 9 4 Except in cases
where rival unions are actively engaged in organizing the unit
employees, the duty to recognize and bargain continues for a
reasonable time once the union has been recognized voluntarily.95 This duty remains in the absence of a collective bargainsubsequently
ing agreement, even in cases where the employer
96
develops a good faith doubt of union majority.
Consistent with its advocacy of employee free choice and
representation by majority support, the Board has established a
pattern of dissolving "company unions", or unions confined to
the employees of a single employer and unaffiliated with any
other union. Such unions were frequently established by employers in order to maintain control and to convert collective
bargaining into a "colloquy between one side of [the employer's] mouth and the other." 97 To dispose of the large volume of resultant litigation, the Board established two
propositions: unaffiliated unions were to be legal if freely chosen by the employees without employer domination,9 8 and the
question of domination or improper interference was to be "one
of fact in each case." 99 The prohibition against employer domistatus"); Carton Bros., 203 N.L.R.B. 774 (1973) (filing of a decertification petition by employees not evidence that union had lost majority status).
92. Washington Manor, Inc., 519 F.2d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1975); Orion Corp.,
210 N.L.R.B. 633, enforced, 515 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1975); Star Mfg. Co., 220
N.L.R.B. 582 (1975), enforced in part, 536 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1976).
93. Dancker and Seilew, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 824 (1963), enforced, 330 F.2d
46 (2d Cir. 1964); Mohawk Business Mach. Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 248 (1956).
94. A union that has been voluntarily recognized may, however, seek an
election in order to obtain the benefits of certification. General Box Co. v.
NLRB, 82 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949).
95. Josephine Furniture Co., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 404 (1968).
96. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972), enforced, 474
F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1973); Tweel Importing Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 666 (1975).
97. R. BROOKS, UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING 68-69 (1939). See also
Crager, Company Unions under the NLRA, 40 MICH. L. REV. 831-33 (1942).
98. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935).
99. 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 28-29, 108, 112-126 (1939). But see SELECT SENATE
COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, INTERIM REPORT, REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 255, 256, 298-299, 300 (1958).

For examples of what the Board and the courts have held to be "company
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nated unions, most prevalent during the 1930's, has been retained by the Act as amended.
The concepts of employee free choice and union majority
status are deeply rooted in labor history. To issue a bargaining
order without inquiry into whether the union has ever attained
majority status would violate employee rights embodied in the
Act, as well as afford the Board the power to exercise punitive
authority.
CONCLUSION

The implications of a bargaining order where the union has
never attained majority status is recognized by the Board, as evidenced by its reluctance over the past twelve years to exercise
the authority granted by Gissel.10 0 United Dairy clearly falls
short of being a Gissel category I bargaining order. The courts
have long recognized the deference to be given to Board expertise10 1 in interpreting the Act and the employer conduct. The
Board, in exercising this expertise, chose to avoid fitting a fact
situation to the Supreme Court's category I imposed authority.
The threshold between bargaining orders where majority status
had been dissipated, and bargaining orders where a majority
has never been attained, has yet to be truly crossed, and, perhaps fortunately, United Dairy lacks the flexibility to open the
door to what could be punitive remedies unauthorized by
statute.102
unions," see Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961) modified on other grounds and enforced, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962) (employer

domination found where employee association was comprised of management personnel); Han-Dee Spring &Mfg. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1542 (1961) (employer sought to thwart outside union by forming grievance committee
which gave its members increased benefits); Wahlgren Magnetics, 132
N.L.R.B. 1613 (1961) (employer contributed financial support to the company union). But see Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.
1967) (evidence did not support NLRB finding that employer illegally dominated union where there was no showing of antiunion bias, employee dissatisfaction, or employer financial contribution).

100. Also to be considered is that the Board's composition had changed.
The original majority who, when considering United Dairy for the first time
in 1979, declined to issue a bargaining order, had left the Board by the time

of remand in 1981. See supra note 63.
101. Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1982) (findings of the Board will not be set aside unless the reviewing court is convinced that the Board has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner).
But see Getman &Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI.
L. REv. 681 (1972).
102. It should also be noted that the bargaining order in United Dairy
came almost eight years after the unfair labor practices and unsuccessful
union election. The risk of imposing a union upon unconsenting employees
is even greater when one considers the high probability of employee

turnover.
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Furthermore, imposing a union on unconsenting employees
is entirely contradictory to one of the most basic principles of
American labor history. The majoritarian principle embodied in
section 9 of the Act implies that a category I collective bargaining order would be punitive, not only to the employer, but to the
employees as well: the very persons for whom statutorily protected representation was established. The Board has repeatedly held that employer-assisted unions will not be tolerated,
but is virtually affording itself the right to impose Board-assisted unions upon employees without inquiry into the employees' free choice. The National Labor Relations Board must not
forget that while the Act serves to protect employers and labor
unions, its most important purpose is to protect the laborer.*
Leslie A. Sammarco

* On May 28, 1982, the National Labor Relations Board for the second
time issued a bargaining order without a showing of union majority support
in Conair Corporation, 110 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1982). Finding violations of Sec-

tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), the Board, not surprisingly, stressed the em-

ployer's outrageous behavior and the narrow margin by which the union
lost the representation election. Id. at 1167. Furthermore, while the majority opinion expressly rejected the proposition that such an order violated
the principle of majority determination, it also emphasized that the risk of
contravening the wishes of the majority is lessened by the union's card sup-

port from 46 percent of the work unit. Id. at 1166-1167. Such reasoning is

predictable after United Dairy and most certainly demonstrates the trend

of future nonmajority bargaining orders. See also United Supremarkets, 110
L.R.R.M. 1173 (1982) (decided the same day as ConairCorporation;bargaining order not issued because employer behavior was not of the Gissel I
type.)

